This Week In Religion and Politics

This Week In Religion and Politics

Where pulpits, courts, parties, and movements collide, this show follows the research behind the headlines on faith, power, identity, and democracy.

When states manage the sacred

This week’s papers show religion as political infrastructure: co-opted by regimes, reworked in constitutions, stigmatized in nation-building, and addressed through security governance. They also track how religious identity travels through voters, vaccine attitudes, AI-agent persuasion studies, and memories of national division.

  • States are not just regulating religion; the papers examine how authorities co-opt religious leaders, reshape constitutional recognition of religion, and use imposed religious identities to define political order.
  • Religious identity keeps surfacing in mass politics, from studies of populist voting to vaccine attitudes and AI-agent simulations of persuasion.
  • Political theology can also be constructive, rethinking inherited anti-communist memory on Korea’s divided peninsula.
Religion as statecraft
Grafting the sacred onto the rogue: The implications of co-optation of religious leaders by authoritarian regimes in Africa
It examines how African authoritarian regimes co-opt religious leaders to legitimize rule, suppress opposition, control public space, and affect religious institutions, civil society, and democratic governance.
From Pluralism to Autocracy: De-Constitutionalization of the Debate over Religion and State in Kaïs Saied’s Tunisia
It argues that Tunisia’s 2022 Constitution is part of a neo-authoritarian transformation and analyzes how it changed constitutional recognition of religion-state questions.
The ideology of religious stigmatization: imposed identities as a tool for constructing the national community in Kazakhstan
It studies how imposed religious identities in Kazakhstan operate as tools for stigma and for defining the national community.
Institutionalizing Religious Moderation in Non-Military Security Governance: The Cidahu Religious Intolerance Case
It analyzes the institutional response to a 2025 religious-intolerance case in Indonesia and its relevance to non-military security governance.
Identity in persuasion and voting
Artificial intelligence agents are responsive to identity cues in persuasive health communication
It tests whether AI agents assigned political or religious identities respond differently to COVID-19 vaccine messages with identity cues.
Grey voters and populist voting. The role of religiosity and national collective narcissism
It investigates the role of religiosity and national collective narcissism in populist-party support among older voters.
Religious beliefs and practices, political orientation, and distrust in healthcare predict attitudes toward mRNA vaccines in the United States
It analyzes how U.S. religious affiliation, religious beliefs and practices, political orientation, and healthcare distrust predict attitudes toward mRNA vaccines.
Memory after division
The Eucharist and the Embodied Resolution of Han (恨, 한): Towards a Eucharistic Political Theology for the Divided Korean Peninsula
It develops a Eucharistic political theology addressing how South Korean Protestant anti-communism shaped antagonistic memory, exclusionary identities, and collective suffering.
Summary written from this week's papers and fact-checked against their abstracts.

Episode

Transcript 27 lines

Cold Open

Jenny Why do we trust a message more when it sounds like it came from our people?
Davis Because before we check the claim, we check the messenger, and that feels a little embarrassing because it's also how everyday trust works.
Jenny I worry that sounds too neat, but this week it gets weirdly testable: even AI agents assigned political or religious identities became more open to vaccine messages when the cues matched their assigned group.
Davis So identity isn't just a background label here; it's a lever for persuasion, belonging, governance, and control...welcome to This Week In Religion and Politics on paperboy.fm.

Stats Overview

Davis This week got big fast: we analyzed five hundred sixty-four records, qualified forty-eight papers, and logged eighty-nine unique authors across eighty-nine country tags. So the overview isn't a thin slice; it's a crowded map of religion, politics, and identity moving at once.
Jenny The qualified set jumped from fourteen last episode to forty-eight this week, up about two hundred forty-three percent. I wouldn't call that a field-wide surge yet, but the topic mix helps explain the feel: nationalism shows up five times, Islamic education three times, and democracy plus authoritarianism each twice.
Davis The wider search did the same thing: query hits went from one hundred sixty-four to five hundred sixty-four, also up about two hundred forty-four percent. What's driving that exactly — more papers, broader indexing, or identity language showing up in places the search now catches?
Jenny Methods are the other clue: twenty-four of the forty-eight papers are qualitative, meaning researchers are reading interviews, texts, classrooms, speeches, or communities closely instead of mainly counting survey answers. Then come ten case studies and eight surveys, so this week leans toward thick description over big-number polling.
Davis The author mix is pretty balanced too: twelve first-time authors, meaning first-ever paper in the metadata; forty emerging authors; and thirty-seven experienced ones. That's roughly fourteen percent first-time, forty-five percent emerging, and forty-two percent established, which makes this less like one senior conversation and more like several lanes meeting.
Jenny And the country spread matters: the top tags are the U.S., Indonesia, South Africa, Russia, and Nigeria at four each, with Poland at three. That fits the through-line: identity isn't just background information this week; it's being used to persuade, belong, govern, and control.

Paper Walkthrough

Paper 1 Artificial intelligence agents are responsive to identity cues in persuasive health communication

Jenny Alright, let's get into the papers with Xiao-Li Nan and Xing-Man Wu's Artificial intelligence agents are responsive to identity cues in persuasive health communication, in Frontiers in Communication in twenty twenty-six. The opening puzzle is sharp: even simulated people became more persuadable when a COVID vaccine message matched the political or religious identity they were given.
Jenny Across two studies, the authors assigned AI agents identities, then changed the message around them. In Study one, politically identified agents were more persuaded when a vaccine message came from a politically congruent endorser, meaning someone on their assigned side. In Study two, moderately and highly religious Christian agents responded more favorably when the vaccine message included religious identity cues, which just means language or signals that say, this message is for people like you.
Davis If the subjects are AI agents, what exactly did they measure here, and what should we not treat as human evidence?
Jenny They measured the agents' stated responses to persuasive COVID vaccine messages after manipulating identity match, first with political endorsers and then with Christian religious cues. The useful thing is that two separate experiments pointed the same way, so the simulated responses weren't random noise. The limit is just as important: this is simulated vaccine-message response, not proof that real Republicans, Democrats, or Christian communities would move the same way.
Davis So the practical takeaway is pretesting, not outsourcing judgment. A health team could use AI agents as a cheap first pass on identity-sensitive language, but the real test still has to be people in actual communities, because this thread, Identity Cues, Real Effects, only matters if the effect survives outside the simulator.

Paper 2 Religious beliefs and practices, political orientation, and distrust in healthcare predict attitudes toward mRNA vaccines in the United States

Davis So after AI agents and simulated vaccine messages, here's the harder test case: real people, real distrust, same health terrain. Erin Solomon and colleagues have a PLOS Global Public Health paper from twenty twenty-six called Religious beliefs and practices, political orientation, and distrust in healthcare predict attitudes toward mRNA vaccines in the United States, using survey data from four thousand nine hundred thirty-nine U.S. adults.
Davis The plain finding is that mRNA vaccine attitudes didn't sort by religion alone. Evangelical Protestant participants showed less support than every other group, atheist participants were the most supportive, and Muslim participants had the highest level of concerns, but politics and distrust in healthcare were tangled into the pattern.
Jenny Were the religious labels actually doing the work here, or were conservative politics and distrust in healthcare carrying the finding under a religious name?
Davis The authors did a secondary analysis, meaning they reused an existing survey dataset, and it had Black Protestant, Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, Jewish, Mainline Protestant, Muslim, atheist, agnostic, and spiritual participants. They used ANCOVA, which is just a way to compare group averages while accounting for other variables, and regression, which asks which factors still predict support or concern when the others are in the model. The strongest support predictors included spiritual communities backing community health, acceptance of evolution, liberal political orientation, less healthcare distrust, more religious attendance, higher income, lower fundamentalist belief, and more support for liberal reproductive and end-of-life views; the big limitation is that these are self-reported attitudes, not proof of actual vaccination behavior.
Jenny That makes the takeaway more useful than a scoreboard of which faith group likes mRNA vaccines. If distrust in healthcare is one of the strongest predictors of concern, and community-health support inside spiritual communities predicts support, then this is Faith as Infrastructure again: don't just correct facts at people, work through trusted communities and repair the trust problem those facts land inside.

Paper 3 "Yeah, it's biased, but … ": Recognition versus moral condemnation of bias across party lines.

Jenny That trust point matters here, because this next paper says even seeing the same thing may not get people to the same moral place. Hannah Waldfogel, Brittany Solomon, and Matthew Hall call it "Yeah, it's biased, but …": Recognition versus moral condemnation of bias across party lines, in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology in twenty twenty-six.
Jenny The plain version is sharp: Democrats and Republicans often agreed that a statement was biased, but they split on how wrong it was depending on who got targeted. Across six prestudies with one thousand one hundred ninety-seven people and eight preregistered experiments with seven thousand one hundred forty-five people, Democrats condemned bias against disadvantaged groups more, while Republicans condemned bias against advantaged groups more.
Davis If both sides can see the bias, why does the moral judgment still split so sharply? Is this really about harm, or about protecting the group each side thinks is treated unfairly?
Jenny The authors tested that by giving people structured cases about race, gender, class, religion, behavior, and even partisanship, then separating recognition from condemnation; recognition means, yes, that targets a group, while condemnation means, and it deserves moral blame or sanctions. In Study one the split extended to endorsing sanctions, and in Study two both sides used the same ideas, like this group isn't really harmed or the statement is just honest, but they used them selectively.
Jenny They also had sixteen supplemental studies, including two more preregistered experiments with one thousand twenty-nine people, so this isn't a one-off lab trick. The limit is that these are structured judgments about selected targets, not every messy fight people have at school boards, workplaces, or online.
Davis That's the Identity Cues, Real Effects thread in miniature: identity doesn't just change whether you notice bias, it changes what you think society owes the target after you notice it. So a depolarization workshop that stops at can we agree this was biased may be quitting before the actual disagreement starts.

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