Faith Moves Through Institutions
This week’s papers treat religion and politics less as separate spheres than as a live traffic system: education, elections, constitutional regimes, state practice, political actors, and public language all shape the crossing. The sharpest work asks when religious authority is negotiated within plural democratic settings, when it becomes overtly partisan, and when theology can resist state-centered or crowd-centered political truth.
- Secularism looks less like a simple wall than a negotiated regime shaped by education, constitutional interpretation, state practice, elections, legitimacy, and governance.
- Religious neutrality in elections can coexist with elite brokerage, moral messaging, and communication with political actors.
- Theological language can make political identity primary—or challenge shame, crowds, and state-centered truth.
Secularism as statecraft
The Politics of Religious Education in Turkey, 1940s–1971: Modern Conservative Consensus in Reformulation and Regulation
It revisits Turkey’s rise of religious education after the 1940s, challenging a simple secular-versus-reactionary story and placing reform inside state legitimacy and governance.
The political (un)making of Indian secularism: Majoritarianism and the decline of counter-hegemonic politics
It argues that Indian secularism’s plural, minority-protecting model is being strained by majoritarian politics, executive centralisation, and politicised religion.
Election religion, quietly and loudly
The dialectics of religion and power: Political communication of NU and Muhammadiyah elites in local electoral politics
It examines how NU and Muhammadiyah elites in Banyumas negotiated institutional neutrality, religious authority, and political engagement during the 2024 General Election and Regional Head Election.
A politização do discurso evangélico no Brasil contemporâneo:
It traces Brazilian conservative evangelical discourse from indirect moral mobilisation in 2018 to explicit institutionalised defence of Jair Bolsonaro in 2022.
The Social Infrastructure of Indonesian Politics: Religious Networks, Elite Brokerage, and Democratic Governance
It shifts attention from formal democratic institutions to Indonesia’s religious networks and elite brokerage as part of how political authority is organized and exercised in everyday practice.
Theology against capture
Kierkegaard and Augustine on Untruth and the Future of Christian Politics
It uses Augustine and Kierkegaard to criticize making political identity the primary test of Christian observance, recentering truth beyond the state or the political as such.
Images of Jesus in Contemporary US Political Discourse
It reads contemporary U.S. political images of Jesus, including MAGA-era portrayals, through the claim that depictions of Jesus often reveal the concerns of their promoters more than the historical Jesus.
Subverting Poverty Stigma—Dub Theology and the Politics of Shame
It develops an austerity-age theology of liberation against poverty stigma, arguing that blaming and shaming people in poverty lets political leaders sidestep systemic causes.
Summary written from this week's papers and fact-checked against their abstracts.
Episode
2026-07-27 – 2026-08-03
54 papers
Covered in this episode
Papers:
Most people who agree with you won’t protest: Predictors of marches and demonstrations from six decades of research
The Social Infrastructure of Indonesian Politics: Religious Networks, Elite Brokerage, and Democratic Governance
Information access under restriction: Drivers of circumvention tool use
Ambient Extremism in Reactionary Digital Politics
+16 more
Transcript 27 lines
Cold Open
Jenny
Why do some people turn their beliefs into action while others just nod along from the couch?
Davis
Because every group chat has that person who loves the cause, sends the article, adds three fire emojis, and then skips the meeting.
Jenny
I’m suspicious of the phrase everyone agrees but nobody shows up, because agreement is easy to say and showing up has a cost.
Davis
And the protest research this week says the hinge isn’t just belief; it’s interest, ideology, membership in organizations, and social media that keeps asking you to leave the couch, so we’re asking how religion builds that machinery...welcome to This Week In Religion and Politics on paperboy.fm.
Stats Overview
Jenny
This week, the feed was big: 897 search hits analyzed, narrowed to a semantic shortlist of 200, meaning the papers closest in meaning to our religion-and-politics query. From there, 54 qualified for the episode, across 99 unique authors and 30 countries.
Davis
That country spread matters for the through-line. The U.S. shows up 6 times and Indonesia 4 times, so we're not just looking at religion as one electoral bloc; we're looking at schools, movements, courts, media, and local practices that make power feel normal or contested.
Jenny
Method-wise, this is a qualitative week: 30 papers are qualitative, 8 are case studies, 5 are surveys, and 4 are content analyses. So the evidence leans toward close context and interpretation, not big population estimates, which means I'd be careful about turning these into universal claims.
Davis
The author mix is pretty balanced too. Out of 99 authors, 28 are first-time authors, meaning their first-ever paper in the available metadata, 38 are emerging, and 33 are experienced, so the week isn't being driven only by senior scholars or only by new voices.
Jenny
The top themes line up with that infrastructure idea: social cohesion and democracy appear 3 times each, while political engagement, political polarization, democratic governance, social justice, pluralism, and religion each appear twice. The one caution is metadata depth: we have 30 countries, but only 2 unique institutions, so geography is much sturdier here than institutional mapping.
Paper Walkthrough
Paper 1 Most people who agree with you won’t protest: Predictors of marches and demonstrations from six decades of research
Jenny
Alright, let's get into the papers, and I want to start with one that has a wonderfully blunt title: Most people who agree with you won’t protest. Shelley Boulianne and J. Earl published it in Science Advances in twenty twenty-six, and they ask a very practical question: among people who might support a cause, who actually shows up at a march or demonstration?
Jenny
The big finding is that agreement is not the same thing as mobilization. Across one hundred eighty-one survey-based studies, with more than eighteen hundred separate estimates, the predictors that keep showing up are political interest, ideology, membership in organizations, and digital or social media use, plus basics like education, age, and living in an urban center.
Davis
So if people already agree with a cause, what pushes some of them into the street while the rest stay home and maybe just nod at the news?
Jenny
The authors use a meta-analysis, which just means they pool findings from many studies so they can see which patterns survive across different samples and decades. The strength here is the comparison: these are surveys that include both participants and nonparticipants, not just interviews with people already holding signs, but the limit is real too, because it is still survey data and it focuses only on marches and demonstrations.
Davis
That changes the job description for movements. You don't just count sympathetic opinion and call it power; you build groups, make invitations travel through real networks, and lower the distance between caring about an issue and putting on shoes.
Paper 2 The Social Infrastructure of Indonesian Politics: Religious Networks, Elite Brokerage, and Democratic Governance
Davis
That putting-on-shoes point is exactly where this next paper starts for me: in The Social Infrastructure of Indonesian Politics, S. Gabbay says Indonesia's democracy after the New Order collapsed in 1998 isn't held together only by elections, but by the groups that make politics reachable.
Davis
Plain version: religious and civic organizations are the roads people use to get from local life to the state, and the paper calls that social infrastructure, meaning the durable relationships and organizations that let authority move through everyday life.
Davis
The concrete examples are Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, two huge Muslim organizations, alongside civil society groups, political parties, business networks, local leaders, and brokers who help with leadership recruitment, policy delivery, conflict mediation, and democratic participation.
Jenny
But how do we know these networks support democracy instead of just protecting insiders with better connections?
Davis
We don't get a cross-democracy causal test here; it's a qualitative framework built from the Indonesian case, tracing how those organizations and brokers link citizens to formal institutions, so the evidence is rich for Indonesia but not proof the same machinery works everywhere.
Jenny
So the practical takeaway is to map the informal religious and civic networks before you praise or panic, because this is Networks Move Power again: the same groups can lower the path into politics and still reproduce unequal access.
Paper 3 Information access under restriction: Drivers of circumvention tool use
Jenny
That line about mapping networks before we praise or panic carries right into Iran, because Information access under restriction asks who actually uses the tools that get around a blocked platform like Telegram.
Jenny
Khosrowjerdi, Keshavarz, Rak, and Jafari surveyed five hundred seventeen Iranian Telegram users, and the big finding is that circumvention isn't just a tech habit; men, politically interested users, and people who feel pushed around by censorship were more likely to bypass restrictions, while people who endorsed censorship were less likely to do it.
Davis
So is this really about technology, or about whether people feel the state leaning on them and want to push back?
Jenny
The authors tested ten factors in an online survey, then used regression, which just means they looked at which traits still mattered after comparing them alongside the others, and six predictors stood out: gender, political interest, motivated resistance to censorship, support for censorship, religiosity, and feeling similar to state media.
Jenny
What didn't matter is almost as interesting: age, education, trust, and use of state media showed no significant effect, but the limit is real too, because these are Iranian Telegram users, not every internet user living under censorship.
Davis
That makes the practical takeaway pretty sharp: digital rights groups can't just hand people a VPN link and call it access, because Networks Move Power here through attitudes, grievance, and political interest, not only through the tool itself.
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